Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

2-21-2011

Efficient Random Assignment under a
Combination of Ordinal and Cardinal Information
on Preferences
Stergios Athanassoglou
athanassoglou@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://services.bepress.com/feem
Recommended Citation
Athanassoglou, Stergios, "Efficient Random Assignment under a Combination of Ordinal and Cardinal Information on Preferences"
(February 21, 2011). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 562.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper562

This working paper site is hosted by bepress. Copyright © 2011 by the author(s).

Athanassoglou: Efficient Random Assignment under a Combination of Ordinal a

Efficient random assignment under a combination of ordinal and
cardinal information on preferences
Stergios Athanassoglou∗
August 2010; revised January 2011

Abstract
Consider a collection of m indivisible objects to be allocated to n agents, where m ≥ n. Each
agent falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a complete ordinal ranking over the
set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of “plausible” benchmark von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utility functions in whose non-negative span his “true” utility is known to lie. An allocation is undominated if there does not exist a preference-compatible profile of vNM utilities at
which it is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation. Given an undominated allocation,
we use the tools of linear duality theory to construct a profile of vNM utilities at which it is is
ex-ante welfare maximizing. A finite set of preference-compatible vNM utility profiles is exhibited such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing with respect to at
least one of them. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the constructed
vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worst-case domination.
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Introduction

In an influential paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [4] consider the probabilistic assignment of n
indivisible objects to n agents. Agents are endowed with strict ordinal preferences over the set of
objects. Objects are assigned via lotteries, which, in light of the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem [3],
can be represented by arrays of probabilities. To accommodate this probabilistic environment,
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [4] adapt the familiar notion of Pareto efficiency to random assignments
by introducing the concept of ordinal efficiency. A random assigment is ordinally efficient if agents
cannot trade probability shares of objects to achieve a new random allocation that stochastically
dominates the original one. Bogomolnaia and Moulin show that ordinal efficiency is equivalent
to the acyclicity of a particular kind of binary relation between objects.1 In a later contribution,
Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1] provide a different characterization of ordinal efficiency based on
a novel concept of dominated sets of assignments. In recent years, ordinal efficiency has been seen
as an important benchmark in random assignment and has motivated the study and comparison of
individual allocation mechanisms (Manea [9], Manea [11], Kesten [8], Che and Kojima [6]).
McLennan [12] offers a different characterization of ordinal efficiency. He considers the weak preference domain and shows that an allocation is ordinally efficient if and only if it is ex-ante welfare
maximizing at some profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities, which is compatible with
the underlying ordinal preferences. In his proof, he establishes and uses a new version of the separating hyperplane theorem. Manea [10] provides a simpler, constructive proof of McLennan’s result
that is based on the acyclicity of the binary relation discussed in [4] and [7]. The constructed profile
of vNM utilities is related to a given weak representation of this (acyclic) binary relation.
In an important recent contribution Carroll [5] extends McLennan’s characterization to economic
environments in which agents’ preferences are incompletely known, so that an agent i’s vNM utility
function is only assumed to lie in nonempty, convex, and relatively open sets Ui . He shows that if an
allocation is undominated (meaning that there exists no allocation that ex-ante dominates it for all
plausible utility functions), then this allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing at some vNM utility
functions ui ∈ Ui . Similar to McLennan, Carroll employs a hyperplane-separation line of reasoning
and focuses on proving the existence of these utility functions (without actually exhibiting them).

Contribution. Our own economic environment is more general than McLennan’s and considerably less than Carroll’s. Each agent i falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a
complete ordinal ranking over the set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of “plausible” benchmark vNM utility functions (representing, say, different states of nature) in whose non-negative span
1

Katta and Sethuraman [7] extend Bogomolnaia and Moulin’s analysis to the weak preference domain.
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his “true” utility is known to lie.2 In this context, a vNM utility profile is said to be preferencecompatible if its individual vNM utility functions are consistent with all available ordinal information
for the first category of agents, and lie in the non-negative span of the benchmark utility functions
of the latter.
Suppose an allocation is undominated, meaning that that there is no other allocation that is guaranteed to Pareto dominate it for all preference-compatible utility profiles. Then, using the tools
of linear duality theory, a preference-compatible utility profile is constructed at which this allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing. When there is full ordinal and no cardinal information, this
result recovers the ordinal efficiency theorem due to McLennan [12]. Consequently, a finite set of
preference-compatible vNM profiles is exhibited such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante
welfare maximizing with respect to at least one of them. A combinatorial upper bound is given
on the cardinality of this set. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the
constructed vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worst-case domination.
It is our hope that the simplicity of our LP-based approach may prove helpful in thinking about
related problems in the growing field of random assignment.

Structure of the Paper. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
and Section 3.1 provides proofs of our main results based on LP duality. Section 3.2 generalizes
the approach pursued in Section 3.1 to arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily undominated) allocations
and offers an interpretation of the constructed vNM utility profiles as subgradients of a function
measuring worst-case domination. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.

2

Model Description

Consider an economy with a set N of n agents and M of m objects indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n
and j = 1, 2, ..., m, respectively. Suppose without loss of generality that m ≥ n, allowing for the
possibility of “dummy” objects that correspond to not being assigned anything at all.
Agents are partitioned in two groups N O and N C . Agents belonging in N O have ordinal preferences
over the set of objects that are expressed by the complete, reflexive and transitive relation i . Hence,
if objects j1 and j2 are such that j1 i j2 and j2 i j1 then agent i is indifferent between them,
and this is denoted by j1 ∼i j2 . If j1 i j2 , but j2 6i j1 , then agent i strictly prefers object j1 to
j2 , and this is denoted by j1 i j2 .
Agents in N C have no such clear-cut ordinal information over preferences. Instead, they have a
2
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3

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 562 [2011]

set of plausible benchmark vNM utility functions {uli : M 7→ <, l ∈ {1, 2, ..., ni }} in whose nonnegative span their “true” utility function is known to lie. In other words, they know that their
true utility will be equal to a non-negative linear combination of the benchmark ones. These sets
of vNM utilities, which fit the far more general framework of Carroll [5], provide a way of imposing
structure on the utility functions that need to be considered.
In what follows, a prime symbol following a given (column) vector denotes the vector’s transpose.
Throughout, we suppress the explicit dependence of our analysis on the economy’s preferences. An
individual allocation for agent i is a non-negative column vector pi = (pi1 , pi2 , . . . , pim )0 such that
P
0
0
0 0
j pij = 1. An allocation p = (p1 , p2 , ..., pn ) is a concatenation of a set of individual allocations pi
P
for i = 1, 2, ..., n that satisfies i pij ≤ 1 for all j ∈ M .3 Let P denote the set of all allocations.
Depending on whether an agent i belongs to N O or N C , an individual allocation pi dominates
another qi , whenever
X

i ∈ NO :

ai j

X

i ∈ NC :

pia ≥

X

qia , for all j ∈ M, or

ai j

uli (a)pia ≥

a∈M

X

uli (a)qia , for all l ∈ {1, 2, .., ni }.

a∈M

If at least one of the above inequalities is strict, then pi strictly dominates qi . The dominance
relation defined on an individual allocation extends to its economy-wide equivalent in a natural
way: an allocation p dominates an allocation q if pi dominates qi for every agent i; p strictly
dominates q if p dominates q, and if pi strictly dominates qi for some agent i. An allocation p is
said to be undominated if there does not exist an allocation q that strictly dominates it.
Adhering to our previous discussion, a profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions
ũ = (ũi : M → <, i ∈ N ) is said to be preference-compatible if
i ∈ N O : ũi (j1 ) ≥ ũi (j2 ) ⇔ j1 i j2 , j1 , j2 ∈ M, and
i∈N

C

: ũi (j) =

ni
X

w̃il uli (j), j ∈ M, for some w̃il ≥ 0

l=1

Finally, an allocation p is ex-ante welfare maximizing at a profile of vNM utilities ũ if it maximizes
the social welfare function
n m
XX

pij ũi (j),

i=1 j=1

over the set of feasible allocations.

An example. To illustrate an instance of our model, consider an economy with three agents (1,
2 and 3) and three objects (a, b and c), in which N O = {1, 2} and N C = {3}. Agent 1 strictly
3

Note how the elements pij of p are positioned in lexicographic order. For reasons that will become apparent in
Section 3, we avoid the more common representation of an allocation as a sub-stochastic matrix.
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prefers object a to b and b to c. Agent 2 strictly prefers b to c and c to a. Agent 3 has no ordinal
information on his preferences; instead he is aware of three different benchmark vNM utilities that
correspond to his preferences in three plausible different states of the world (u13 , u23 , u33 ), where
u13 = (100, 5, 1), u23 = (1, 50, 90), u33 = (43, 45, 44).
Clearly, agent 3 cannot determine a definitive ordinal ranking from the above information. Instead,
he simply knows that his true utility, u3 , will be some non-negative combination of the benchmarks
u13 , u23 , and u33 , so that it lies in the set
{u3 : w31 u13 + w32 u23 + w33 u33 , w31 ≥ 0, w32 ≥ 0, w33 ≥ 0},

3
3.1

An Efficiency Theorem
The Main results

In what follows, we use LP duality to prove the paper’s main result.
Theorem 1 Suppose p̂ is undominated. There exists a preference-compatible profile of vNM utilities at which p̂ is ex-ante welfare maximizing.
Proof. Consider an allocation p̂ ∈ P . Where applicable, let 0 denote a zero vector of appropriate
dimension. Consider the following linear program (LP) in standard form:
min

p,r,q,s

subject to:

−

 X X
m

rij +

i∈N O j=1

X

pik − rij =

ki j
m
X

uli (j)pij

ni
X X

j=1
n
X

qil

i∈N C l=1

X

p̂ik , j ∈ M, i ∈ N O

ki j

− qil =

j=1
m
X



m
X

uli (j)p̂ij , l ∈ {1, 2, ..., ni }, i ∈ N C

j=1

pij + sj = 1, i ∈ N
pij = 1, j ∈ M

i=1

p ≥ 0, r ≥ 0, q ≥ 0, s ≥ 0.

(1)

By definition, the solution (p, r, q, s) = (p̂, 0, 0, ŝ), where ŝj = 1 − i∈N p̂ij , is feasible and establishes an upper bound of 0 for the problem’s optimal cost (i.e., objective value).
P

Using the definition of domination, it is easy to see that p̂ is undominated if and only if the optimal
solution (p∗ , r∗ , q∗ , s∗ ) of the primal problem (1) is equal to (p̂, 0, 0, ŝ), thus yielding an optimal
cost of 0.
5
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Taking the dual of (1), and letting 1 denote a unit vector of appropriate dimension, we obtain4
m
X X

max

x,w,y,z

X

xij

i∈N O j=1

X

subject to:

ni X
m
X X

p̂ik +

wil uli (j)p̂ij +

i∈N C l=1 j=1

ki j

n
X

yi +

i=1

m
X

zj

j=1

xik + yi + zj ≤ 0, j ∈ M, i ∈ N O

ki j
ni
X

uli (j)wil + yi + zj ≤ 0, j ∈ M, i ∈ N C

l=1

x ≥ 1, w ≥ 1
y free variable, z ≥ 0.

(2)

By strong duality (see Theorem 4.4 in [2]), the primal problem has an optimal cost of 0 (which, as
mentioned before, is equivalent to p̂ being undominated) if and only if the optimal solution of the
dual problem (2), (x̂, ŵ, ŷ, ẑ),5 satisfies
m
X X
i∈N O

x̂ij

j=1

X

ni X
m
X X

p̂ik +

i∈N C

ki j

ŵil uli (j)p̂ij +

l=1 j=1

n
X

ŷi +

i=1

m
X

ẑj = 0.

(3)

j=1

Now, let û denote a profile of von-Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) utilities such that, for all j ∈ M ,
X

i ∈ N O : ûi (j) =

x̂ik ,

ki j
ni
X

i ∈ N C : ûi (j) =

uli (j)ŵil ,

(4)

l=1

Recall that since (x̂, ŵ, ŷ, ẑ) is feasible, we must have (x̂, ŵ) ≥ 1. In combination with Eqs. (4),
this immediately establishes that û is preference-compatible. (Note how when an agent i ∈ N O is
indifferent between two objects, they are assigned equal utility.) Rearranging terms, Eq. (3) can be
rewritten in the following way
m
X X

⇒

x̂ij

i∈N O j=1
n X
m
X

X

p̂ik +

ni X
m
X X

i∈N C l=1 j=1
X
n
m
X

ki j

ûi (j)p̂ij = −

i=1 j=1

ŷi +

i=1

ŵil uli (j)p̂ij

X
n

=−

ŷi +

i=1

m
X



ẑj

j=1



ẑj

(5)

j=1

Again by dual feasibility we must have
0 ≤ ûi (j) ≤ −(ŷi + ẑj )

(6)

Now, consider an arbitrary p ∈ P . We have
n X
m
X

(6)

ûi (j)pij

≤

i=1 j=1
(5)

=

n X
m
X
i=1 k=1
n X
m
X

(1) (2)

−(ŷi + ẑj )pij

≤ −

X
n
i=1

ŷi +

m
X



ẑj

j=1

ûi (j)p̂ij .

(7)

i=1 j=1
4
5

For details see Chapter 4.2 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [2].
The “hat” notation is adopted to denote the dependence of the optimal dual variables on p̂.
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This observation concludes the proof.
Thus, we have constructed a preference-compatible utility profile û at which the undominated
allocation p̂ is ex-ante welfare maximizing. Before we prove our next result we focus on the feasible
region of the dual LP (2) and note that no variable yi can ever be strictly positive. Thus, we can
safely impose the constraint y ≤ 0 so that the dual feasible region is substituted by the following
polyhedron:
X

xik + yi + zj ≤ 0, j ∈ M, i ∈ N O

ki j
ni
X

uli (j)wil + yi + zj ≤ 0, j ∈ M, i ∈ N C

l=1

x ≥ 1, w ≥ 1
y ≤ 0, z ≥ 0.

(8)

We now provide a definition for the extreme points of a polyhedron.
Definition 1 An extreme point of a polyhedron Π is a vector v1 ∈ Π such that we cannot find two
vectors v1 , v2 ∈ Π, both different from v1 , and a scalar λ ∈ [0, 1] that satisfy v1 = λv2 + (1 − λ)v3 .
In other words, an extreme point is an element of a polyhedron which cannot be written as a convex
combination of two other elements (of the polyhedron), which are both distinct from it. Extreme
points will play an important role in our next result.6
Theorem 2 There exists a finite set of preference-compatible utility profiles such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing for at least one of this set’s elements. This set
has cardinality no more than the number of extreme points of polyhedron (8).
Proof. The set of (updated) dual constraints {x ≥ 1, w ≥ 1, y ≤ 0, z ≥ 0}, ensures that the
dual feasible region (8) is a polyhedron that does not contain a line (see Definition 2.12 in [2]).
Consequently, Theorem 2.6 of [2] implies that the dual feasible region contains at least one extreme
point.
Let E denote the set of all extreme points of (8). By Theorem 2.3 and Corollary 2.1 in [2] its

cardinality is bounded above by ab , where a represents the number of constraints and b the number
of variables of polyhedron (8). For every extreme point e = (xe , we , ye , ze ) ∈ E, introduce a vNM
utility profile ue consistent to Eq. (4) such that
i ∈ N O : uei (j) =

X

xeik ,

ki j
6

I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing attention to this result.

7

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 562 [2011]

i ∈ N C : uei (j) =

ni
X

uli (j)wile .

(9)

l=1

Now, let P̂ denote the set of undominated allocations and consider an arbitrary p̂ ∈ P̂ and the
associated dual LP (2). By Theorem 2.8 of [2], the optimum of this dual LP must be attained at
some extreme point e of (8). Consider the vNM utility profile ue as given by Eq. (9) for extreme
point e. Following the logic of Theorem 1, the allocation p̂ will be ex-ante welfare maximizing at
ue . Noting that the feasible region of LP (2) (represented by polyhedron (8)), and therefore its
finite set of extreme points, is unaltered by changes in the dual’s objective function, and repeating
our argument for any element of P̂ establishes the result.

Remarks. The equivalence between extreme points and basic feasible solutions of a polyhedron
(Theorem 2.3 in [2]) provides algebraic insight into the structure of the extreme points of (8) and
gives a sense of their total number.7 Indeed, applying this equivalence result to the special structure
of polyhedron (8),in order to actually count its extreme points is an interesting combinatorial
exercise in its own right. Having said this, the bound of Theorem 2 can be made considerably
tighter when we consider that we can safely desregard extreme points e that satisfy
X

xeik + yie + zje < 0, for all j ∈ M , for some i ∈ N O , and/or

ki j
ni
X

uli (j)wile + yie + zje < 0, for all j ∈ M , for some i ∈ N C .

l=1

This is because feasible points satisfying the above conditions cannot, by first principles, be optimal:
increasing the xik or wil variables until one of the above constraints binds will increase the objective
function value without resulting in infeasibility.

3.2

An interpretation of the constructed vNM Utilities

In this section, we make a more general connection between undominatedness and the profile of vNM
utilities discussed in Section 3. Indeed, duality theory lends the constructed vNM utility profile û
of Theorem 1 a particular kind of interpretation, regardless of whether the candidate allocation p̂
is undominated. We begin by defining the concept of a subgradient that is commonly encountered
in convex analysis.
Definition 2 Let f : X → < denote a convex function defined on a convex set X . Let x̂ ∈ X . A
vector v belonging in the ambient space of X is a subgradient of f at x̂ if
f (x̂) + v · (x − x̂) ≤ f (x), ∀x ∈ X .
7

For more details on polyhedra and extreme points, the reader is referred to Section 2.2 in [2].
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Returning to our model, let p̃ ∈ P and define the vector-valued function
g : P → <|N

O |m+

P

i∈N C

ni

,

such that g(p̃) is a column vector whose entries are the first
|N O |m +

X

ni

i∈N C

entries of the right-hand-side of the constraint vector of primal problem (1) applied to an allocation
p̃. That is,
i ∈ N O : g(p̃)ij

X

=

i ∈ N C : g(p̃)il =

p̃ik , j ∈ M

ki j
m
X

uli (j)p̃ij , l ∈ {1, 2, ..., ni }.

j=1

Next, given two vectors x ∈ <|N

O |m

P

i∈N C

ni

we define u to be a vector-valued function

P

i∈N C

ni

→ <nm

and w ∈ <

u : <|N

O |m+

where u(x, w) consistent with Eq. (4). Echoing Eq. (5) in the proof of Theorem 1, we can rearrange
terms and establish the following identity for all p̃ ∈ P
(x, w)0 g(p̃) = u(x, w)0 p̃.

(10)

We use the primal problem (1) to define an allocation’s efficiency deficit as the negative of the
greatest amount by which it can be dominated by another feasible allocation. Or, equivalently, as
the greatest combined ordinal and cardinal efficiency loss that its application can result in. Let F (p̂)
denote the feasible region of the primal problem (1) as a function of a candidate allocation p̂ ∈ P .
The efficiency deficit of an allocation p̂ is defined as the optimal cost of the primal problem (1)
when the allocation appearing in the right-hand-side of the constraints is given by p̂. Formally, it
is denoted by a function D : P → <− such that
D(p̂) =

 X X
m

min

(p,r,q,s)∈F (p̂)

−

rij +

i∈N O j=1

ni
X X



qil .

i∈N C l=1

Proposition 1 The efficiency deficit D(·) is a piecewise-linear convex function on the set P .
Proof. Recall the proof of Theorem 2 and consider the set of extreme points E of the updated dual
feasible region (8). We may write


e

e

e



e 0

D(p̂) = max (x , w , y , z ) (g(p̂), 1, 1)
e∈E



e 0

e

e

e 0



= max u(x , w ) p̂ + (y , z ) (1, 1) .
e∈E

(11)

9
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Since the maximum of a set of linear (and therefore convex) functions is itself convex, the result
follows.
We are now ready to generalize the insights obtained in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 Consider an allocation p̂ ∈ P and the associated primal LP (1). Suppose the vector
(x̂, ŵ, ŷ, ẑ) is an optimal solution of the associated dual LP (2) and consider the vNM utility profile
û given by Eq. (4). This profile is (a) preference-compatible, and (b) a subgradient of the efficiency
deficit D at p̂.
Proof. Part (a) follows immediately from dual feasibility. We turn to part (b). The simple
argument follows the proof of Theorem 5.2 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [2]. Strong duality implies
that
n
m
(10)

(x̂, ŵ, ŷ, ẑ)0 (g(p̂), 1, 1) = D(p̂) ⇒ u(x̂, ŵ)0 p̂ +

X

ŷi +

i=1

X

ẑj = D(p̂).

j=1

Consider now an arbitrary p̃ ∈ P . By weak duality (see Theorem 4.3 in [2]), we have
u(x̂, ŵ)0 p̃ +

n
X

ŷi +

i=1

m
X

ẑj ≤ D(p̃).

j=1

Hence, we may conclude that
u(x̂, ŵ)0 (p̃ − p̂) ≤ D(p̃) − D(p̂), for all p̃ ∈ P.

4

Directions for Future Research

The results in this paper provide a concise characterization of efficiency in environments with a mix
of ordinal and cardinal information on agent preferences. In particular, an allocation is undominated
if and only if its efficiency deficit a piecewise-linear convex function on the set of allocations, is zero.
We believe that this insight, coupled with the more general optimization framework explored in this
work, may prove useful in future research in random-assignment and house-allocation models. In
particular, one may frame different kinds of existence questions by setting up a trivial optimization
problem (i.e., one with a zero objective), imposing as constraints desired properties of efficiency,
equity, and voluntary participation, and examining its dual. A similar approach may be helpful
in the comparison of individual allocation mechanisms; in particular, one can attempt to provide
bounds on the difference of their ex-ante welfare, for a range of preference-compatible utility profiles.
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